Estonia's Intelligence Chief Warns: Russia Preparing for NATO Confrontation Within a Decade
Estonia's top intelligence official has delivered a stark warning to European allies: while Russia lacks the capacity to attack NATO in the immediate future, the Kremlin is systematically rebuilding its military for a direct confrontation within the next ten years. Kaupo Rosin, director general of the Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service, told reporters that "Russia has chosen a path which is a long-term confrontation... and the Kremlin is probably anticipating a conflict with NATO within the next decade," according to the Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service's annual report titled "International Security and Estonia." The assessment, released in February 2026, identifies a critical three to five-year window for European nations to prepare their defenses, a timeline that exposes uncomfortable questions about whether NATO's current rearmament pace can match Moscow's military reconstitution.
The apparent contradiction in Estonia's assessment, that Russia poses no immediate threat yet demands urgent preparation, reveals the mechanism driving European security calculations. Russia does not currently have the capacity to mount a direct attack on NATO within the next two years, according to analysis reported by Yournews. "There are not enough resources available at the moment for Russia to attack NATO," Rosin stated, as reported by Yournews. Yet this temporary incapacity masks a deliberate strategy: Moscow has expanded military recruitment and sped up weapons production during the war in Ukraine, per analysis from the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. Russian military planners envision creating new combat units and expanding troop levels along NATO's frontier to two or three times their prewar size, Yournews reported. The gap between current weakness and future strength is precisely where the danger lies.
The Reconstitution Race
The Kremlin is rapidly reconstituting its military capabilities, far exceeding pre-war levels in some sectors, according to the Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service report. This buildup is not defensive posturing but preparation for offensive capability. Russia is preparing for a major military buildup along NATO's eastern border, Yournews reported, while simultaneously maintaining combat operations in Ukraine. Moscow must keep a large portion of its armed forces deployed inside occupied Ukrainian territory and within Russia itself, per Yournews, which explains why an immediate NATO attack remains impossible. But the trajectory is clear: Russia is racing to rebuild its forces while Europe accelerates its rearmament, according to ground reporting from the region. The question is which side will be ready first.
Putin's personal calculus drives this buildup. "In his head, he still thinks that he can actually militarily win at some point," Rosin observed, as quoted by Yournews. This assessment suggests the Russian president views the current phase not as a strategic setback but as a temporary pause before renewed expansion. Putin shows no real inclination to halt the nearly four-year-long invasion of Ukraine, Yournews reported, and Russian negotiators are deliberately dragging out talks with Washington, per the same outlet. The war in Ukraine has strengthened Russia's drivers for security competition with the West, according to Belfer Center analysis. Rather than chastening Moscow, the conflict appears to have hardened its resolve for long-term confrontation with the Western alliance.
Gray Zone Operations: The Warning Signs
While conventional military confrontation remains years away, Russia has already opened multiple fronts against NATO through what intelligence analysts call gray zone operations. Moscow has conducted gray zone activities across Europe including cyberattacks, sabotage, weaponization of migration, and targeted assassinations, the Belfer Center reported. Russia is conducting sophisticated cyber warfare targeting critical infrastructure, according to the Estonian intelligence report. Russia is conducting physical vandalism and sabotage operations across NATO member states, the same report noted. These operations serve dual purposes: they test NATO's cohesion and response capabilities while degrading Western infrastructure and public confidence.
The information dimension of this campaign is equally aggressive. Russia is conducting widespread disinformation campaigns aimed at destabilising Western democracies, the Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service found. Russia is orchestrating organised immigration crises on eastern NATO borders, the same report stated. These tactics, while falling below the threshold of armed conflict, represent a sustained assault on European stability. Moscow's objective would likely be to fracture NATO rather than dismantle it outright, according to Belfer Center analysis. By exploiting divisions within the alliance and eroding public trust in democratic institutions, Russia aims to weaken NATO's collective defense commitment before any potential military confrontation.
Strategic Objectives: What Russia Wants
Understanding Russia's long-term military preparations requires examining Moscow's strategic objectives. Russia seeks to create a buffer to block the spread of Western-backed democracy on its borders, the Belfer Center reported. Russia seeks to preserve a practical veto over its neighbors' geopolitical alignments, the same analysis found. Russia seeks to advance a nationalist vision of a "Greater Russia" in the near abroad, according to Belfer Center research. These objectives have remained consistent across decades of Russian foreign policy, but the war in Ukraine has transformed them from diplomatic preferences into military imperatives. Russia has enduring concerns about geographic vulnerabilities, the Belfer Center noted, concerns that the expansion of NATO to include Finland and Sweden have only intensified.
Russian officials regard the United States as their primary adversary, Yournews reported, but the practical focus of military preparations centers on NATO's eastern flank. The Belfer Center report analyzes two scenarios on NATO's eastern flank that illustrate potential Russian approaches. One scenario focuses on gray zone activities that could culminate in a limited, covert incursion to seize territory, according to the Belfer Center. The second scenario depicts a large-scale Russian offensive to cut the Suwałki Gap, the same analysis found. A larger assault through the Suwałki Gap would likely seek to cut the Baltic states off from the rest of NATO, the Belfer Center reported. This 65-mile corridor between Poland and Lithuania represents NATO's most vulnerable point, and its seizure would isolate Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania from allied reinforcement.
The Preparation Gap
Estonia's warning carries particular weight given the country's position on NATO's front line. Estonia is a NATO member bordering Russia, according to ground reporting, and Estonia is a staunch supporter of Ukraine, the same source noted. The country's intelligence services have consistently provided accurate assessments of Russian capabilities and intentions throughout the Ukraine conflict. Now those services are sounding an alarm about European preparedness. Estonia's top intelligence official warned Europe has a critical three to five-year window to prepare for direct military confrontation with Russia, according to the Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service report. That window is already closing.
NATO members are expected to meet the 2% of GDP defence spending target, the Estonian report noted, but this benchmark, once considered ambitious, may prove inadequate for the threat environment Estonia describes. The alliance's defense industrial base, atrophied after decades of post-Cold War peace dividends, cannot quickly scale to match Russian production. Russia will likely pursue a middle course in the years ahead, more cautious than its 2022 invasion but still opportunistic, the Belfer Center assessed. This opportunism means NATO must prepare not for a single, predictable attack but for a range of scenarios that could emerge whenever Moscow perceives Western weakness or distraction.
Internal Russian Vulnerabilities
Estonia's assessment does not suggest Russian military dominance is inevitable. The Wagner mutiny highlighted growing problems with elite loyalty and command cohesion in Russia, according to Belfer Center analysis. The June 2023 rebellion by Wagner Group forces, though quickly suppressed, exposed fractures in Russia's military command structure that could complicate future operations. Moscow's reliance on private military contractors and prison recruits during the Ukraine campaign has degraded the professional military culture that would be essential for sustained NATO confrontation. These internal weaknesses, however, do not eliminate the threat; they merely shape its timeline and character.
The diplomatic track offers limited reassurance. Recent U.S.-mediated meetings between Russian and Ukrainian envoys have been portrayed as constructive by both sides, Yournews reported. A recent agreement was brokered in Abu Dhabi involving the United States, Ukraine and Russia that led to the release of more than 300 prisoners, according to Yournews. Steve Witkoff is Trump's special envoy for negotiations, the same outlet noted. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said Washington urged both sides to reach a settlement by June, Yournews reported. But Trump has previously announced deadlines for ending the conflict that passed without major consequences, Yournews noted. The pattern suggests diplomatic progress may be more apparent than real, with Russia using negotiations to buy time for military reconstitution.
The Strategic Calculus
Russia's approach in the coming years will balance ambition against capability. Russia will likely pursue a middle course in the years ahead, more cautious than its 2022 invasion but still opportunistic, the Belfer Center assessed. This middle course means continued gray zone operations, sustained pressure on NATO's eastern members, and steady military buildup, all while maintaining plausible deniability and avoiding direct confrontation until Moscow believes the correlation of forces has shifted in its favor. The Kremlin's patience is strategic: having committed to long-term confrontation, Russia can afford to wait for the right moment while Western democracies struggle to maintain defense spending and public attention.
The implications for European security are profound. Estonia's intelligence assessment represents not merely one country's view but a warning from the alliance member with the most direct exposure to Russian capabilities and intentions. The three to five-year preparation window Rosin identifies is not a prediction of when Russia will attack but an estimate of how long Europe has to build credible deterrence. If NATO fails to achieve that deterrence, the scenarios the Belfer Center analyzes, from limited territorial seizures to full-scale offensives against the Baltic states, become increasingly plausible. The mechanism is clear: Russian military reconstitution plus Western preparation failure equals increased risk of conflict.
What Comes Next
The path forward requires European leaders to translate Estonia's warning into concrete action. Defense spending increases, already underway across the alliance, must accelerate. Defense industrial capacity, the ability to produce ammunition, vehicles, and weapons systems at scale, must expand. Forward deployment of NATO forces to the eastern flank must continue. And perhaps most importantly, Western publics must understand that the current period of relative safety is temporary, a window that will close as Russia completes its military reconstitution. The Estonian intelligence assessment makes clear that Moscow has chosen confrontation. The only question is whether NATO will be ready when that confrontation arrives.
Estonia's position on the front line of this emerging confrontation shapes its perspective but does not diminish its credibility. The country's intelligence services have earned respect through accurate assessments throughout the Ukraine conflict. Their warning that Europe faces a decisive preparation window deserves serious attention from alliance capitals. The mechanism Estonia identifies, Russian long-term preparation meeting potential Western complacency, represents the central security challenge for the transatlantic alliance in the coming decade. Whether that challenge is met will depend on decisions made in the next three to five years, decisions that will determine whether NATO's deterrence holds or whether the scenarios Estonia warns against become reality.