The One-Way Ratchet
The Supreme Court struck down President Trump's global tariffs Friday using the same legal doctrine that killed President Biden's student loan forgiveness program two years ago, according to the Court's majority opinion. But while Biden's $500 billion initiative died completely, Trump announced new 10% tariffs the same day his program was rejected, exposing how supposedly neutral constitutional limits constrain different types of presidential power in fundamentally different ways.
The 6-3 decision centered on tariffs Trump imposed under a 1977 emergency powers law, including "reciprocal" tariffs he levied on nearly every country after declaring trade deficits a national emergency in April 2025, the Court's ruling stated. The Court applied the "major questions doctrine", a test that blocks federal agencies from making enormous policy decisions through vague statutory authority without clear Congressional authorization. The Congressional Budget Office had estimated the economic impact at $3 trillion over the next decade, or roughly $22,000 per U.S. household.
Trump's administration argued the emergency powers law, which allows the president to regulate importation during emergencies, also permits him to set tariffs, according to the government's legal briefs. Other presidents have used this law dozens of times for sanctions, but Trump was the first to invoke it for import taxes. The Treasury collected more than $133 billion from these tariffs through December, approximately $970 per household, per federal data.
How the Doctrine Actually Functions
The major questions doctrine sounds like a neutral brake on executive overreach. When an agency claims authority to reshape major aspects of the economy or society, the Court demands that Congress spoke clearly in granting that power, as Chief Justice Roberts wrote in the majority opinion. Ambiguous old statutes won't support transformative new programs.
Applied to Biden's student loan plan, this test was fatal. The administration had relied on a 2003 law allowing the Education Secretary to "waive or modify" student loan terms during national emergencies, according to the Department of Education's legal arguments. The Court ruled this language too vague to support canceling half a trillion dollars in debt affecting 43 million borrowers. The program had no alternative legal foundation. It simply ended.
Applied to Trump's tariffs, the same test produced a different outcome. The Court found the 1977 emergency powers law, which mentions regulating "importation" but not "tariffs", too ambiguous to support $3 trillion in trade restrictions, the ruling stated. Trump called the ruling "deeply disappointing," and Vice President Vance characterized it as "lawlessness," according to statements released by the White House.
But Trump's tariff framework didn't end. It shape-shifted.
The Constitution gives Congress the power to levy tariffs, but Congress has delegated this authority through multiple statutes over decades, according to constitutional scholars. The emergency powers law was just one option. Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act allows tariffs for national security reasons. Section 301 of the Trade Act permits them in response to unfair foreign trade practices. These laws move slower and impose more procedural requirements, but they function. Top administration officials told reporters they expect to maintain the tariff structure under these other authorities.
The Asymmetry Built Into the System
This reveals something fundamental about how presidential power actually operates under the major questions doctrine. The test doesn't ask whether a policy is good or bad, popular or unpopular. It asks whether Congress clearly authorized it, as the Court's precedents establish.
For expansive Democratic policies, student loan forgiveness, broad climate regulations, healthcare program extensions, Congress often hasn't delegated authority that clearly or broadly. These initiatives typically stretch existing statutes to cover new problems or populations. When the Court applies the major questions doctrine, there's frequently no alternative path. The policy dies.
For Republican enforcement and restriction policies, tariffs, immigration enforcement, regulatory rollbacks, the administrative state often has multiple tools available. Congress has historically delegated broad authority over trade, borders, and agency discretion not to regulate. When the Court blocks one statutory basis, another usually exists.
This isn't necessarily partisan bias by the justices. It reflects what Congress has actually delegated over time. Trade policy has been presidential territory since the 1930s, with lawmakers adding new tariff authorities in 1962, 1974, and 1988, according to legislative records. Student loan forgiveness authority was never explicitly granted at scale. The Court is reading the statutes Congress wrote.
But the practical effect is asymmetric. A doctrine that claims to protect Congressional prerogatives ends up functioning as a one-way ratchet, blocking expansion while merely inconveniencing contraction.
What Changed and What Didn't
Legal opposition to Trump's tariffs crossed the political spectrum, including libertarian and pro-business groups typically aligned with the GOP, court filings show. A dozen largely Democratic-leaning states sued, as did small businesses selling plumbing supplies, educational toys, and women's cycling apparel, according to the lawsuit dockets. Companies including Costco have lined up in court demanding refunds. These businesses face direct cost increases: importers of Chinese goods saw tariff rates jump from an average of 3% to as high as 145% under the reciprocal tariff program, according to U.S. Customs data. A small plumbing supply company in the lawsuit reported paying an additional $47,000 in tariffs in just three months, costs it struggled to absorb or pass to customers already concerned about affordability, court documents stated.
Trump had called the case one of the most important in U.S. history and said a ruling against him would be an economic body blow to the country, according to his public statements. The Court disagreed about his legal authority under the emergency powers law. Three justices, Samuel Alito, Clarence Thomas, and Brett Kavanaugh, dissented, the ruling showed.
But the ruling changes remarkably little about actual trade policy. The decision explicitly noted it "does not stop Trump from imposing duties under other laws," according to the Court's opinion. Those laws have more limitations on speed and severity, but they're functional. Trump's same-day announcement of new 10% global tariffs wasn't defiance, it was the system working exactly as designed. The president lost access to one tool and immediately picked up another.
The businesses that sued won their constitutional argument. Whether they'll see their money back remains unclear. Whether the new tariffs will be structured differently enough to matter for their bottom lines is an open question. They proved the president exceeded his authority under one statute while he was already pivoting to different authority under another.
The Theory and the Reality
Constitutional law professors will teach this case as an example of the major questions doctrine constraining executive power. The Court forced the president to respect statutory limits and Congressional prerogatives. The system of checks and balances functioned.
That's true in theory. In practice, the case demonstrates the gap between judicial doctrine and executive reality. The same legal test that permanently killed a Democratic policy affecting 43 million student loan borrowers temporarily inconvenienced a Republican one affecting every American household that purchases imported goods. The difference isn't in how the Court applied the test, it's in what Congress had already delegated and what alternatives existed.
The major questions doctrine treats these situations as equivalent: both presidents overreached, both got checked. But one president's program died while the other's changed clothes. The doctrine appears neutral while producing systematically different outcomes based on the type of power being exercised.
This matters beyond tariffs. The Court will likely apply this same test to other Trump initiatives and to whoever wins the presidency next, legal analysts predict. Each time, the question won't just be whether the legal theory is sound, it will be whether alternative statutory paths exist. For some types of presidential action, they will. For others, they won't.
The Treasury still holds $133 billion collected under the now-invalid emergency powers tariffs, and that figure is likely higher now, according to Treasury Department data. The legal framework for refunds remains uncertain. Trump's new tariffs under different authority are already in effect.